Anticipatory governance in biobanking: security and risk management in digital health by Rychnovska, Dagmar
Anticipatory governance in biobanking: security and risk 
management in digital health
Article  (Published Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Rychnovska, Dagmar (2021) Anticipatory governance in biobanking: security and risk 
management in digital health. Science and Engineering Ethics, 27. a30 1-18. ISSN 1353-3452 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/98622/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
Vol.:(0123456789)




Anticipatory Governance in Biobanking: Security and Risk 
Management in Digital Health
Dagmar Rychnovská1 
Received: 27 October 2020 / Accepted: 4 April 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Although big-data research has met with multiple controversies in diverse fields, 
political and security implications of big data in life sciences have received less 
attention. This paper explores how threats and risks are anticipated and acted on 
in biobanking, which builds research repositories for biomedical samples and data. 
Focusing on the biggest harmonisation cluster of biomedical research in Europe, 
BBMRI-ERIC, the paper analyses different logics of risk in the anticipatory dis-
course on biobanking. Based on document analysis, interviews with ELSI experts, 
and field research, three types of framing of risk are reconstructed: data security, 
privacy, and data misuse. The paper finds that these logics downplay the broader 
social and political context and reflects on the limits of the practices of anticipa-
tory governance in biobanking. It argues that this regime of governance can make 
it difficult for biobanks to address possible future challenges, such as access to bio-
medical data by authorities, pressures for integrating biobank data with other type of 
personal data, or their use for profiling beyond medical purposes. To address poten-
tial controversies and societal implications related to the use of big data in health 
research and medicine, the paper suggests to expand the vocabulary and practices of 
anticipatory governance, in the biobanking community and beyond.
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health
 * Dagmar Rychnovská 
 d.rychnovska@sussex.ac.uk
1 Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
 D. Rychnovská
1 3
  30  Page 2 of 18
We try to enhance the protection of data, and we forget to protect the individu-
als.1
Introduction
Biobanking is becoming increasingly popular around the world. The US programme 
“All of Us” aims to collect medical and health data from more than 1 million volun-
teers to “accelerate health research and medical breakthroughs, enabling individual-
ised prevention, treatment, and care” (National Institutes of Health, 2020). Chinese 
commercial biobank Zhangjiang Biobank seeks to gather 10 million samples, while 
the publicly-funded China Kadoorie Biobank has already collected over 500.000 
samples, similar to public biobanks in the UK and Finland (Orchard-Webb, 2018). 
The largest biobank is located in Graz, Austria, storing over 20 million biomedical 
samples (Medizinische Universität Graz, 2020). Biobanking is particularly strong 
in Europe, where there are not only numerous large biobanks, but also intense col-
laboration among them, especially under the umbrella of BBMRI-ERIC (Biobank-
ing and BioMolecular Resources Research Infrastructure—European Research 
Infrastructure Consortium). BBMRI-ERIC is a major international player in the 
field of biobanking. Funded by the European Commission, it works towards build-
ing a research infrastructure for the harmonisation and globalisation of biomedical 
research in Europe (BBMRI-ERIC, 2016). Despite the lack of a universally accepted 
definition, biobankers typically claim that the aim of biobanks is to act as a research 
repository and thus to collect, store and process biological samples and associated 
medical data and information (BBMRI-ERIC, 2016; Shaw et al., 2014).
In general, biobanking is situated at the intersection of two broader trends: big-
data research and the datafication of health. However, despite many benefits, these 
trends raise diverse concerns. Big-data analysis has been heavily politicised due to 
numerous cases that show how this research can disrupt privacy and be exploited 
by for discriminatory purposes, human rights abuses, surveillance, or political gain 
(e.g., Klimburg-Witjes & Wentland, 2021; Sætnan et al., 2018). Similarly, the data-
fication of medicine and health raises questions about the potential misuse of big 
data due to the highly sensitive nature of medical and genetic data (Hoeyer et al., 
2019; Rothstein, 2015; Ruckenstein & Schüll, 2017). Although the security of big 
data is discussed in diverse fields, discussion of biobanking as a specific area of big-
data research is minimal. Debates on risk assessment and disaster recovery focus on 
mitigating risks (e.g., fires and flooding) to individual biobanks (Henderson et al., 
2013; Simeon-Dubach et al., 2013), but discussions about societal risks related to 
the rise of organized collections of big medical data are surprisingly rare (Müller 
et al., 2020; O’Doherty et al., 2016; Sankar & Parker, 2017; Sariyar & Schlünder, 
2019). At the same time, we can observe raising interest of states in the use of big 
1 Expert interview, 10th October 2019 (1).
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medical data in political governance—not only for digital epidemiology, but also for 
policing and surveillance (Wee, 2020).
What can “go wrong” with biobanking? This paper opens up a debate on the 
political and security implications of organised collections of health data and bio-
logical samples and thus contributes to the research on the societal implications of 
biobanking and health data collections (e.g. Goisauf & Durnová, 2019; O’Doherty 
et  al., 2016). Specifically, it aims to explore how threats and risks are anticipated 
and acted on in the governance of biobanking in Europe. For that purpose, it stud-
ies the discourse on ELSI (ethical, legal, and social implications) in biobanking, 
reconstructs the logics of risk that are present in this discourse, and reflects on the 
practices of anticipatory governance in biobanking. The research draws on studies 
of anticipatory governance (Aykut et al., 2019; Guston, 2014) and political science 
research on security and risk governance (Aradau et al., 2014; Huysmans, 2011; van 
Munster, 2005).
The paper first discusses the conceptual lens through which anticipatory govern-
ance of risks in biobanking is approached. Second, it outlines the political contexts 
in which biobanking evolved and briefly summarizes the controversies already dealt 
with in the field. Third, drawing on data from ethnographic research, interviews, and 
document analysis, the paper studies ELSI discourse on biobanking to reconstruct 
three logics of risk anticipation there: data security, privacy, and data misuse. The 
findings point to the prevalence of technical and legal framing of risks and threats 
and reluctance to engage with social and political context of biobanking research. 
To explore what inhibits addressing broader societal implications and vulnerabili-
ties of biobanking, the paper discusses the practices of anticipatory governance in 
biobanking and argues that they dampen more critical reflection of the use of big-
data research in digital health and medicine.
Anticipatory Governance and Practices of (In)security
The governance of science and technology has been marked by increasing attempts 
to predict the future path of technology in the society (Nowotny, 2016). This endeav-
our has gradually become professionalised as anticipatory governance, which is 
understood as “a broad-based capacity extended through society that can act on a 
variety of inputs to manage emerging knowledge-based technologies while such 
management is still possible” (Guston, 2014: 219). The practices of anticipa-
tion focus on the future as an object of scientific inquiry and political intervention 
(Anderson, 2010). Anticipatory expertise involves a broad scope of stakeholders, 
from those engaged in foresighting to production ensemble (Guston, 2014: 218). 
Practices of anticipatory governance have been established mostly in the framework 
of technology assessment, research ethics, and responsible research and innovation.
This research looks at anticipatory governance as constituting a repertoire of 
meaning-making practices through which specific entanglements of science, tech-
nology, and society are constructed as risks. For that purpose, I turn to social scien-
tific research on security, specifically critical security. Critical security studies make 
visible the inherently political nature of security, whether exercised as exceptional 
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politics (logic of security) or as mundane, bureaucratic routines of risk management 
(logic of risk) (van Munster, 2005). It unpacks the meaning of security and prob-
lematises the assumptions that security practises draw on, including who or what is 
to be protected, from what or whom, how, by what means; who is to be in charge of 
making such decisions; who shall provide knowledge and expertise to inform these 
decisions; and whose voices are silenced in these decisions (Aradau et  al., 2014). 
Critical security scholars also suggest that practices of security tend to hinder open 
democratic deliberation on specific social problem, by moving decision-making on 
insecurities to the hands of designated professionals (Buzan et al., 1998; Huysmans, 
2011).
To study how threats and risks are anticipated and acted on in the governance of 
biobanking, I focus on the following elements in the discourse: logic of risk (how the 
insecurity is conceptualised and what logic of risk is involved), referent object (who 
or what shall be protected from an actual danger or a potential risk), risk factors 
(who or what is seen to contribute to the production of risks or dangers), technolo-
gies of governance (what measures are used to predict, manage and address these 
issues), and social effects (what subjects the technologies of governance construct 
and how they structure social relations). Before presenting the results of the research 
on diverse logics and technologies of risk that are mobilised in the governance of 
biobanking, biobanking and its controversies are introduced in more detail.
Biobanking, Biosecurity, and Big‑Data Controversies
Biobanking draws on the long history of medical data collection (De Souza & 
Greenspan, 2013), but in the context of digitalisation, (international) data sharing, 
and increasing interest in artificial intelligence-driven research, biobanks gain a new 
character as data repositories. Medical and pharmaceutical research drawing on a 
combination of basic health data, omics data, and lifestyle data shall lead to more 
personalised medical treatment of individuals and a better prediction of diseases. 
Biobanking is thus presented of as a key step towards personalised medicine (Ntai 
et al., 2014; Prainsack, 2017) and as crucial to the bioeconomy (Hauskeller & Belt-
rame, 2016) and health data economy (Tupasela et al., 2020).
Biobanking has the novel ability to gather unprecedented quantities as well as 
new quality of health data (specimens coupled with health records and lifestyle 
information). This, however, brings new challenges in terms of this data use and 
potential misuse. Since most biobanks are publicly owned (BBMRI, 2013), their 
governance shall be subject to public scrutiny.
Indeed, when biobanks became popular in late 1990s, they were met with a con-
siderable suspicion. The most famous controversy was the attempt of the biophar-
maceutical company deCODE to build, under an exclusive state licence from the 
Icelandic government, the first population-wide genomic biobank that would include 
data from the entire Icelandic population. Doctors, scientists, activists, and patients 
vocally resisted the initiative, criticising the presumed consent model and limited 
options for withdrawing from the state-sponsored yet privately operated biobank 
database, fearing breaches of privacy and commercialisation and exploitation of 
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health data (BBMRI, 2013: 9; Winickoff, 2015). After several years of opposi-
tion and involvement of international experts, the initial contract was abandoned 
and the biobank resorted to the informed-consent model (Høyer, 2008). The field 
of biobanking has learnt many lessons from the Icelandic controversy, developed a 
new discourse about the value of biobanking for society, structured its practices in a 
more inclusive and collaborative spirit, and adopted the informed-consent model as 
a fundamental principle in biobanking governance (Pálsson, 2008).
Two decades later, there remain numerous concerns, yet biobank professionals 
focus mostly on ELSI issues, thus lagging behind discussions on (in)security of big-
data research in other fields. Interestingly, European biobankers focus on biosecurity 
only in the context of biobanks storing pathogens (Müller et al., 2020), working thus 
with the understanding of biosecurity by the World Health Organization (WHO), 
which speaks about it in the context of “the protection of microbiological assets 
from theft, loss or diversion, which could lead to the inappropriate use of these 
agents to cause public health harm” (WHO, 2004: vii). In contrast, scientific and 
security authorities in the US start to pay attention to the potential security risks of 
big-data in life science (AAAS, 2014) and suggest that “Big Data in the life sciences 
is taking the biosecurity discussion beyond pathogens and toxins” (Kozminski, 
2015: 3897). Emphasised in this regard are mostly the risks of illegitimate access 
(by unauthorised individuals) to big-data and the misuse of those data. However, 
others also raise concerns regarding the secondary use of health data (O’Doherty 
et al., 2016), such as the availability of biobanking data to governmental agencies, 
their use for other than health research purposes, or their integration with other type 
of data about participants and others (Sankar & Parker, 2017; Sariyar & Schlünder, 
2019). How are these concerns reflected among biobanking professionals in Europe, 
and how do they anticipate future insecurities that this technology may bring about?
Methodology
To investigate the anticipatory governance of risks and threats in biobanking, I 
turn to the ELSI discourse on biobanking in the community of European biobank-
ers. Specifically, I explore the case of BBMRI-ERIC—a legal entity which brings 
together biobanks storing human biological data. BBMRI-ERIC is one of 21 Euro-
pean Research Infrastructure Consortia (ERICs) funded by the European Com-
mission (European Commission, 2020) and representing cutting-edge European 
research. BBMRI-ERIC currently includes 20 member states and one international 
organisation, yet individual biobanks are also members. Established in 2013, it con-
nects researchers, biobankers, industry, and patients to boost the exchange of bio-
medical data and research. BBMRI-ERIC works towards “making new treatments 
possible” and, to that end, it “shall establish, operate and develop a pan-European 
distributed research infrastructure of Biobanks and Biomolecular Resources in order 
to facilitate the access to resources as well as facilities and support high-quality bio-
molecular and medical research” (BBMRI-ERIC, 2016: art. 2.1). BBMRI-ERIC 
operates primarily on a non-economic basis and allows the research community in 
its member states access to its resources and services (BBMRI-ERIC, 2016: art. 3).
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The study focuses specifically on ELSI Common Service group within the 
BBMRI-ERIC, which provides consultancy on ELSI to BBMRI-ERIC members 
and conducts research on ELSI themes. It can be seen as a site of knowledge pro-
duction about social implications of biobanking and as a platform for sharing best 
practices in biobanking management. The data on ELSI discourse in BBMRI-ERIC 
have been generated in document analysis (BBMRI-ERIC documents such as posi-
tion papers and reports), ten semi-structured interviews with ELSI Common Service 
experts from BBMRI-ERIC,2 and participant observations at the European Biobank 
Weeks 2018 and 2019—an annual conference bringing together medical profession-
als, private companies, researchers, ethicists and other stakeholders specialising in 
biobanking. The research participants were asked following questions: how long 
have they been in the field of biobanking and what agenda have they dealt with; 
what are the main future challenges to which the field of biobanking is preparing; 
how do biobankers think about what can go wrong with biobanking; through what 
processes do biobankers anticipate these future insecurities; how are these issues 
talked about in the community and at their home institutions at ELSI meetings; what 
measures are taken to prevent these risks and threats from happening; and which 
challenges are in their view overlooked. Participants were also offered to discuss any 
issue which they find relevant yet omitted in the interview.
In the coding of the data, I focused on what issues were identified in the data 
sample as risks or security concerns relevant for biobanking (risk logics). Then, 
drawing on frame analysis (Benford & Snow, 2000), I explored diagnostic frames, 
so who or what is seen as contributing to the actualization of the risk (risk fac-
tors) and who or what is seen as affected (referent object), and prognostic frames, 
so how are these risks supposed to be addressed, through what means and policies 
(technologies of governance), and which actors are involved in this and how (social 
effects). Based on the analysis, I reconstructed three logics of risk and compared the 
specific aspects of these rationalities. The findings are presented in the following 
section. Participant quotations are presented to illustrate the three security themes. I 
point out that while two risk rationalities are consistently and strongly present in the 
data, the third one—data misuse—is less pronounced. I then critically reflect on this 
finding in the context of the practices of anticipatory governance in the biobanking 
community.
The research can be read as a first inquiry into the anticipatory governance of 
risks in biobanking, but more data would be needed to explore the security and 
risk management in biobanking in more depth: for instance, no interviews were 
conducted with professionals responsible for the IT security in biobanking. Also, 
2 Most of the ELSI Common Service experts were approached with the interview request and ca. half 
of them responded. Given the small size of this community, no further details about the interviewees are 
revealed in order to protect their anonymity. The interviews were conducted in person by the author. All 
interviews were conducted at a conference, except for one which was conducted at the workplace of the 
participant. The participants were familiarized with the goals of the research project and gave written 
informed consent. The interviews lasted on average 29 min, were audio recorded and bilateral only, and 
were fully or partly transcribed. On request, transcripts were returned to participants for corrections. The 
findings were not discussed with the interviewees.
1 3
Anticipatory Governance in Biobanking: Security and Risk… Page 7 of 18    30 
the discussion on ELSI issues in the BBMRI-ERIC might be different from how 
biobanks in different member states think about security and risk management. 
Finally, given the ongoing debate on GDPR and biobanking (e.g., Slokenberga et al., 
2020), as well as new challenges related to engaging biobanking in the fight against 
the COVID-19 pandemic (Henderson et al., 2020), the discourse on risk in biobank-
ing will likely evolve in the next years.
Three Logics of Risk in the Anticipatory Governance of Biobanking
This section presents results of research on anticipating risks in the governance of 
biobanking, focusing on the case of BBMRI-ERIC. Three rationalities of risk were 
identified—data security, privacy, and data misuse. These logics are not mutually 
exclusive—while each one points to different aspects of biobanking and is managed 
via different measures, they can work together and can be mutually enforcing.
Data Security
The most prevalent notion of future challenge in biobanking relates to data security, 
understood as a problem of securing the data stored in biobanks against unauthor-
ised access,3 and building other barriers of access to biobanks. For instance, many 
interviewees equate the issue of threats and risks in biobanking with technical IT 
security practices, as exemplified by this interviewee:
That we would somehow extremely deal with this issue, that is not the case, 
but we know from experience in other countries what happened to the data 
when they were processed by the health service provider and there were hack-
ing attacks, which I think could happen in the framework of biobanking, 
research may be distorted in the worst case, so it is actually a question of cyber 
security.4
IT security is also an area with the most explicit politics of risk assessment in 
biobanking. The notions of risks in the context of data security are most explicit, 
as they draw inspiration from other fields, including health service, and the broader 
societal discourse on cybersecurity. For ELSI experts, these risks are understood 
mostly as hacking, manipulation of data, and blackmail. The risk assessment con-
ducted by the IT Common Service in BBMRI-ERIC is more elaborate, and in the 
area of (data) security it focuses on securing the data flow against threats such as 
malicious modification of data or code, information disclosure, and denial of ser-
vice, and on threats associated with access to data (Holub & Common Service IT, 
2016: 40).
3 For instance, BBMRI-ERIC works with this meaning in different contexts (https:// www. bbmri- eric. 
eu/ bbmri- eric/ elsi- gloss ary). The IT Common Service of BBMRI-ELSI also works with “security” as a 
synonym for “data security” (cf. Holub & Common Service IT, 2016: 9).
4 Expert interview, 9th October 2019 (1).
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The countermeasures against these risks are physical barriers, technological bar-
riers and access regulation. These measures are perceived as reliable and uncontro-
versial, and overall, ELSI experts express great satisfaction with this technical form 
of risk management, without the need to deal with the issue further. For example, 
when asked about whether biobankers think about the risks that biobanking may 
pose, one interviewee argued
I would think so, but I have never heard that specifically. It is more about how 
do we ensure we are doing this lawfully. (…) I think that technical and security 
measures are very good. They have got a very good knowledge about quality, 
technology, data security. So, it is not about misuse, it is about making sure 
that they have got the lawful basis for the appropriate use. I think that is the 
bigger concern.5
This response is an example of a broader discursive pattern in the biobanking com-
munity, suggesting that the responsibility for security of biobanks lies in the techni-
cal domain, and that if IT and technical measures are followed properly, security 
does not need to be dealt with further. A similar response explicitly downplays the 
need for any additional attention to security:
[Security] is an issue because it is something that we need to take care of and 
is critical, it is important, but is not a problem. It should not interfere with the 
progress of biobanking. We should take care of it as we did [for] years and 
years and years in the hospital.6
The biobanking community perceives the protection of human samples and data 
stored in and shared across biobanks as a highly relevant yet technical issue. This 
rationality of risk draws on the notion of unauthorised (unlawful) access to biobanks 
as the main threat to the security of data, and it consequently encompasses a wide 
range of measures to protect the whole system (its physical as well as electronic 
component). This logic empowers actors like IT professionals and lawyers to iden-
tify threats, manage them, and design countermeasures. As long as everyone com-
plies with the rules and procedures, the community does not feel the need to deal 
with the issue beyond the sphere of designated professionals.
Privacy
When asked about what issues deserve more attention in biobanking, one inter-
viewee responded that “privacy is the main concern.”7 Such responses are well 
represented in the ELSI literature about biobanking, documenting an ongoing con-
troversy in the biobanking community about the best design for the contractual 
relationship between data participants and biobanks regarding the future use of 
the biosamples and data (e.g., Clayton, 2005; Murphy et al., 2009; Rothstein et al., 
6 Expert interview, 9th October 2019 (4).
7 Expert interview, 9th October 2019 (2).
5 Expert interview, 9th October 2019 (3).
1 3
Anticipatory Governance in Biobanking: Security and Risk… Page 9 of 18    30 
2016). The three mutually intertwined aspects of this controversy—technical, ethi-
cal, and legal—reflect layers of attempted control over the future use of biobanking 
data.
In BBMRI-ERIC, privacy is primarily dealt with as a matter of data protection, 
aimed at the protection of individual participants. For instance, in a risk assessment 
analysis, BBMRI-ERIC points to the threats of linkability and identifiability of data, 
content unawareness (i.e., that participants are unaware of what information is being 
shared about them), and policy/consent non-compliance (Holub & Common Ser-
vice IT, 2016: 41). To address these problems, technical measures are developed and 
implemented at the BBMRI-ERIC level and promoted as best practices to individual 
biobanks.
In the realm of ethics and law, privacy also plays an important role. Specifically, 
ELSI experts debate how to balance the traditionally understood rights of research 
subjects (who shall be informed of the exact purpose and procedure of the research 
in which they participate) with the specificities of biobanks as research repositories 
for future studies rather than for particular, clearly defined research projects (e.g. 
Bledsoe, 2017; Lunshof et al., 2008). Protecting privacy is thus entangled with the 
uncertainty about future trajectories of the biobanking research—as one interviewee 
expressed, “we do not know now how we can help the participants, [or] what further 
information might be useful in future research studies.”8 The debate on protecting 
privacy reveals differing perspectives on the value of individual privacy in contrast 
to biobanking as a greater societal good bringing benefits for public health, and it 
has evolved towards prioritising the latter (Starkbaum & Felt, 2019).
The idea that biobanks participate in creating international, open-access genomic 
databases and thereby contribute to the universal benefit of producing knowledge 
on human genome is not new (Knoppers & Chadwick, 2005), yet the shift towards 
framing biobanking as a public good was most pronounced in negotiating the re-
use of health data as the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
was being prepared. The GDPR was initially seen as conflicting with the very idea 
of biobanks as repositories of personal data that will have multiple and unforeseen 
uses in the future. During negotiation of the regulation, biobanks (represented by 
the BBMRI-ERIC) were among the most vocal proponents calling for exceptions 
for researchers. The exception was eventually incorporated: data used for research 
purposes have a special status codified in GDPR article 89(1). As Starkbaum and 
Felt (2019) show, in discussions between biobank professionals (represented by 
the BBMRI-ERIC) and the EU, negligence of biobank data was presented as a key 
threat—biomedical researchers argued that the main value of biobanking lies not in 
its benefits to individual patients but in its potential benefits for public health.
This communitarian approach directly relates to the debate on designing 
informed consent for data participants. There are currently two main approaches to 
constructing consent: the first prioritizes anonymisation of data but it significantly 
decreases the quality of the data (especially the prospects of linking different type 
of data about participants) and their potential for biomedical research. The second 
8 Expert interview, 9th October 2019 (5).
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calls for broad consent, which legitimizes the reuse of data in biobanks without the 
need to consult data subjects on specific use of their data. This approach is based on 
prioritising solidarity, mutuality, and the public value of biobanks, and shall be com-
plemented by high transparency of biobanks and their openness to patient engage-
ment (e.g., Gainotti et al., 2016). An alternative of broad consent is dynamic con-
sent, which allows participants to track online the use of their data and biosamples 
and to opt out of certain areas of research (Prictor et al., 2018).
The technologies of privacy governance primarily refer to the individual as the 
referent object and to protection against risk factors, such as the disclosure of sensi-
tive information or findings about an individual, and the use of participants’ data for 
undesired (i.e., not consented) research purposes. Simultaneously, though, the value 
of individual privacy is weighed against the collective benefits of biobanking. The 
risk of potentially violating individual privacy is framed as running against the risk 
of making biobanking-driven research ineffective and failing to deliver its promised 
benefits. This results in disputes about appropriate technologies of risk governance, 
especially ethical and legal, which is demonstrated by the unease with which GDPR 
is interpreted and implemented. Addressing privacy concerns openly empowers 
individual data participants and in turn incentivises biobanks to better demonstrate 
the benefits and security standards of their work to the public.
Data Misuse
The last risk rationality covers rather marginal theme of biobanking as a source of 
insecurity to society, caused by the use of biobank data for unintended (and poten-
tially harmful) purposes. This logic works (rather implicitly) with the state or third-
party actor as the source of threat. This framing is rather vague, but some interview-
ees acknowledged that for some kinds of broader questions about the use of biobank 
data, there is no room in the current ELSI debate to address this particular issue. As 
one interviewee eloquently suggested,
Security is a bit like the elephant in the room. We are kind of not really 
addressing the issue. Maybe because we don’t really know what the security 
issues might be in five, ten, twenty years from now. Also, maybe because we 
probably do not want to acknowledge that there are security issues, so it is a 
way of reassuring ourselves that everything is fine. (…) [M]y experience is that 
each time we bring these issues to the table, we are kind of not totally ignored, 
but not taken seriously. Because if you look at the current situation, there have 
not been any large catastrophes yet that we can refer to. (…) It is very hard to 
foresee what to expect, and that is one of the reasons why biobankers are not 
really addressing this yet – because we don’t really know what to grasp.9
When asked about the specific trajectories of the overlooked misuse scenarios, 
experts mentioned the use of biobank data for some kind of genetic profiling of 
9 Expert interview, 10th October 2019 (3).
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people, with a special focus on the rising role of artificial intelligence in biomedi-
cal research. For instance, one interviewee pointed out the importance of unpacking 
algorithms using our data that can serve for discriminatory purposes—whether for 
pricing, insurance, or other—and mentioned genetic profiling as a specific risk:
We need more transparency [about] how our data is used (…) It might be 
noble to do research, but the data is out [there] and the algorithms are there, so 
others can use those things to create discriminatory profiles, and they do not 
even need to apply them via machines, but with their brains… I am really a lit-
tle bit concerned that nobody is aware of the problem.10
Another participant reflected on the role of political context in considering the risks 
of unintended use of data, and expressed their reservations against transfer of data 
and samples to the United States, as it does not have the same data protection laws 
as the EU, and data might be shared there with insurance companies or industry.11
Concerns about the misuse of profiling to discriminatory purposes are directly 
relevant for biobanking, since profiling is at the heart of personalised medicine (Nuf-
field Council on Bioethics, 2010). Profiling in general can be defined as “the deduc-
tion of information based on some characteristics of an individual or a group of indi-
viduals, which are either known beforehand or also deduced.” (Sariyar & Schlünder, 
2019: 2). It thus contains three elements: “it has to be an automated form of process-
ing; it has to be carried out on personal data; and the objective of the profiling must 
be to evaluate personal aspects about a natural person” (European Commission, 
2018: 6–7). While “[g]enetic profiling is used in healthcare and biomedical research 
for associating genetic characteristics with increased or decreased likelihood of 
developing and overcoming certain diseases” (Sariyar & Schlünder, 2019: 3), medi-
cal profiling can be understood as “new services offering direct-to-consumer body 
imaging as a health check and personal genetic profiling for individual susceptibility 
to disease” (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2010: xvii).
A fairly overlooked actor in the anticipatory discourse on biobanking is the state, 
particularly with regard to its potential to exploit the data in biobanks. Yet some 
experts point out that the state is entitled to act with the aim of using biobank data 
for profiling—and in fact has already done so in several instances (O’Doherty et al., 
2016). Albeit illegal under current terms of informed consent, there may be legiti-
mate reasons for this intervention. The problem, as pointed out by one interviewee, 
is how this practice becomes entangled with the broader socio-political climate:
[Y]ou see the trends in Europe, and not only Europe, but worldwide, what is 
happening now in terms of politics, we see that nationalist groups are getting 
stronger, racist groups are getting stronger, so there is already risk that our data 
will be used for these kinds of purposes, because we are part of the world, 
we are not isolated. So that is a concern. And there are already examples of 
biobanks data being accessed by police or by courts for different purposes. 
10 Expert interview, 10th October 2019 (1).
11 Expert interview, 9th October 2019 (5).
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And I would say that as long as you are in a democratic state with an inde-
pendent justice and a fair trial system, you might say that this is fine, [though] 
consent-wise it is not, but the problem is that democracy is not written in 
stone, the political landscape is changing, so there are clear threats that this 
data can be misused in many differ way - for political purposes, for discrimina-
tory purposes, for many different purposes that we cannot control.12
In sum, this logic of risk points to the secondary use of biobank data for discrimina-
tory purposes (especially medical or genetic profiling) or other harmful purposes by 
the state or third-party actors as the threat. The referent object is rather implicitly the 
whole society, or parts of it, who might be subject to discriminatory or otherwise 
harmful treatment. The concrete measures that can be taken against this type of inse-
curity, beyond suggestions to discuss these issues in the field, are not considered, 
making the risks of misuse the “elephant in the room”.
Anticipatory Governance and Its Limits
Table 1 compares the three logics of risk. While the first two are present in all types 
of analysed data and addressed in the community, the third rationality is rather 
vague and comparably underrepresented (and thus also incomplete in the analysis, 
as the table shows). Simultaneously, the third logic is the only one that considers 
broader socio-political conditions and the possibility of data/technology misuse. 
How and why is the problematisation of potential risks of biobanking to the soci-
ety downplayed in the anticipatory discourse? This section argues that this omission 
can be situated first in the practices of anticipatory expertise in BBMRI-ERIC, and 
second in the emphasis on reliability and trust through which the field responds to 
existential concerns about the sustainability of the current biobanking model.
The focus of current risk management in biobanking is on protecting the biobank 
infrastructure against unauthorised access and use, and on designing the contract 
between individual participant and biobanks. These technologies of risk governance 
are based on the principles of individual responsibility, safety and compliance. On 
the contrary, political and security implications of biobanking do not belong to the 
main themes discussed at biobanking conferences or by the ELSI Common Service 
team. Instead, the ELSI experts focus more on practices of responsible research and 
prefer to talk about “awareness” as a call for attentiveness of biobank professionals 
to potentially undesired scenarios involving the biobank samples and research. The 
limited room for critique in the existing biobanking culture is a problem described 
already by O’Doherty et al., who observe that the ELSI practices and current safe-
guards in health data collections “focus on informed consent and anonymization, 
which are aimed at the protection of the individual research subject. They are not 
intended to address broader societal implications of health data and sample collec-
tions” (O’Doherty et al., 2016: 2).
12 Expert interview, 10th October 2019 (3).
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Understanding the reluctance of the ELSI community to address the societal 
implications of biobanking and related security concerns, however, shall go beyond 
pointing the limits of current legal and technical measures or the lack of experience 
with serious data breach/ misuse scenarios. As one interviewee explains,
these kinds of [security] issues are very rarely discussed. And if you try to 
bring it up, it is very difficult… I think it is kind of taboo. … Because there 
is a lack of evidence, because it would be really threatening to our business, 
because what we are doing is intrinsically working with health data and sam-
ples, so if all of these security issues really exist and happen, then we do really 
have a problem. So that is why I think we like to assure ourselves that this is 
fine, that we have all the security systems in place and that it is not that scary.13
This neglect of bigger questions about the societal implications of biobanking and 
risks related to unintended use of biobanking data, however, is not surprising when 
considering how biobankers think about the future of the field in general. In fact, the 
key contemporary concern in the BBMRI-ERIC community, pronounced at confer-
ences and in interviews, is how to ensure the sustainability of biobanking.14 The 
sustainability concern is a narrative of an existential threat to the very imaginary of 
biobanking as a public good that revolutionizes public health and contributes to the 
rise of precision medicine (cf. Aarden, 2017). On the one hand, biobankers com-
plain that biobanks and their data are underused, and that a lot of metadata are miss-
ing from samples. On the other hand, the lack of progress of biobanking research 
contributes to increasing pressure from funders for more direct results of biobank-
ing and for finding new ways to remain financially sustainable.15 The very model of 
biobanking in Europe is thus seen as under threat. To save it, biobankers seek ways 
to increase the benefits of this research infrastructure and ensure its scientific and 
financial sustainability. As argued by Biobank Graz researchers, “[s]ustainability of 
biobanks has to be realised on more than the financial level, since without the trust 
and participation of the public, every biobank would be empty” (Sargsyan et  al., 
2015: 419).
Taken together, biobanks seek to increase their potential to act as providers 
of a public good, yet dependent existentially on a structure of relations based on 
reliability and trust in biobanking. However, the pressure to act as a trustworthy 
and responsible partner may incentivise avoiding any controversies related to this 
research. This arguably diminishes the prospects of deliberating on broader and 
tougher questions, including the collaboration with private actors, or the condi-
tions under which it would be legitimate to use biobank data for other than health 
research, for instance by state authorities. This anticipatory culture thus arguably 
dampens the prospects of caring for security and societal implications of biobank-
ing more pro-actively (cf. de La Bellacasa, 2011), beyond the emphasis on indi-
vidual responsibility, safety, and compliance with technical and legal standards.
13 Expert interview, 10th October 2019 (3).
14 The issue of sustainability was mentioned by almost all interviewees and was discussed at the relevant 
conferences.
15 Expert interview, 9th October 2019 (3).
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Conclusion
Security has been so far an overlooked layer in the discussion on biobanking, 
both in academic literature and in the professional field. The reasons for this lie 
arguably, first, in the anticipatory culture of the field, which pays attention to 
technical, legal, ethical, and participatory issues in biobanking governance, and, 
second, in more pressing concerns about the sustainability of the current model 
of biobanking. However, recent developments, including healthcare data breaches 
and integration of health data with other type of big data (as popularized during 
the COVID-19 pandemic), have made visible new types of use for, but also risks 
related to digital health data. Therefore, discussion about ethical, legal, and par-
ticipatory aspects of biobanking—and digital health in general—cannot shy away 
from tending to security challenges as well, however distant they may appear.
This paper sought to open up the debate on security and biobanking and scru-
tinized how threats and risks are anticipated and acted on in the governance of 
biobanking. By studying the anticipatory discourse on biobanking in Europe, 
three logics of risk were reconstructed, focusing on the protection of data and 
biosamples from unauthorised access (data security), protection of individual pri-
vacy from the disclosure of sensitive information and from undesired research 
(privacy), and potential societal vulnerability to harmful or discriminatory sec-
ondary use of biobank data (data misuse).
The existing anticipatory practices, the language used to think about risks and 
threats, and the broader anticipatory culture of the community, however, might 
be insufficient to grasp the complexities of future challenges, including security 
risks. For instance, it remains unclear how the field might face dilemmas regard-
ing demands to use the biobank data for “exceptional” reasons (e.g., criminal 
investigations, civil lawsuits) and how it will face commercialisation and poten-
tial pressures to new uses of data (e.g., rationing of health care resources, risk 
profiling of individuals). Therefore, we need to expand the vocabulary and prac-
tices of anticipatory governance so that we are able to discuss more openly the 
potential controversies related to the use of big data in health research and medi-
cine, both in the biobanking community and beyond.
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